Maxims and Reflections
No matter how many good things we hear about ourselves, we never learn anything new.
If we never flattered ourselves, the flattery of others could not harm us.
The desire to merit the praises we are given strengthens our virtue; and those we receive concerning our spirit, courage and beauty contribute to augmenting them.
Few people are wise enough to prefer a criticism that is useful to them to false praise.
Just as great spirits make much understood with few words, small ones have the gift of speaking very much without saying anything.
One is never as ridiculous with the qualities one has, as with those one affects to have.
The surest way of being tricked is to think oneself more clever than others.
It is more shameful to distrust one's friends than to be fooled by them.
Confidence that you will please people is often an infallible way of displeasing them.
Quarrels would not last for a long time if the fault were only on one side.
Petty spirits are too hurt by little things; great spirits notice everything, and are not hurt.
We hardly find that anyone has the ability to reason, except people who are of our opinion.
Only people who are contemptible fear being treated with contempt.
If we did not have any faults, we would not take as much pleasure in noticing those of others.
The refusal of praise is a desire to be praised twice over.
Many people say that they scorn wealth, but few are able to give it away.
How is it that we have a good enough memory to remember the smallest things that have happened to us, and that we don't have a good enough memory to remember how many times we have told them to the same person?
Envy makes people more difficult to reconcile than hatred.
One forgives people for as long as one loves.
It is more necessary to study men than books.
Wisdom is to the soul what health is to the body.
Before wanting something very strongly, one must look to see if the person who has it is happy.
Working with one's body delivers one from the pains of one's spirit, and this is what makes the poor happy.
Few things are needed to make a wise person happy; nothing can content a fool; that's why nearly all men are miserable.
We torment ourselves less over becoming happy than over making people think that we are.
One can always do what one wants, provided that one wants it very much.
It is difficult to understand how great a resemblance and how great a difference there is between all men.
The good and bad things that happen to us do not move us according to how great they are, but to how sensitive we are.
We must not be offended that others hide the truth from us, since we so often hide the truth from ourselves.
A convincing proof that man was not created as he is now, is that the more reasonable he becomes, the more embarrassed he becomes over his extravagance, his baseness, and the corruptness of his feelings and inclinations.
Philosophers only condemn riches because of the bad use we make of them; it depends on us to acquire them and to use them without crime and, instead of them nourishing vices and helping them to grow, in the way that a forest increases a fire, we can consecrate them to all the virtues and make them more pleasing and more brilliant.
One must console oneself for one's faults, when one has the strength to admit them.
The power that the people whom we love have over us is almost always greater than the power we have over ourselves.
Love is to the soul of the person who loves what the soul is to the body that it animates.
L'amour est à l'âme de celui qui aime ce que l'âme est au corps qu'elle anime.
Nothing is easier to forget than something we are permitted to talk about.
On n'oublie jamais mieux les choses que quand on s'est lassé d'en parler.
To be able to be always good, it's necessary that others believe that they can never be malicious toward us with impunity.
Pour pouvoir être toujours bon, il faut que les autres croient qu'ils ne peuvent jamais nous être impunément méchants.
The confidence that a person has in himself is the cause of the larger part of the confidence others have in him.
La confiance que l'on a en soi fait naître la plus grande partie de celle que l'on a aux autres.
How can we expect someone else to guard our secret if we cannot guard it ourselves?
Comment prétendons-nous qu'un autre garde notre secret si nous ne pouvons le garder nous-mêmes?
It is an annoying sickness to work at conserving ones health with too great of a regime.
C'est une ennuyeuse maladie que de conserver sa santé par un trop grande régime.
Seriousness is a mysterious carriage of the body invented to hide the faults of a spirit.
La gravité est un mystère du corps inventé pour cacher les défauts de l'esprit.
Good taste comes more from judgment than from intelligence.
Le bon goût vient plus du jugement que de l'esprit.
It shows great cleverness to hide ones cleverness.
C'est une grande habileté que de savoir cacher son habileté.
Perfect bravery is being able to do without witnesses what one would be able to do in front of everyone.
La parfaite valeur est de faire sans témoins ce qu'on serait capable de faire devant tout le monde.
The sign of extraordinary merit is that the people who envy it the most are forced to praise it.
La marque d'un mérite extraordinaire est de voir que ceux qui l'envient le plus sont contraints de le louer.
No one is more often wrong than someone who can't admit when he is.
Il n'y a point de gens qui aient plus souvent tort que ceux qui ne peuvent souffrir d'en avoir.
What makes other people's vanity so unbearable is that it hurts our own.
Ce qui nous rend la vanité des autres insupportable, c'est qu'elle blesse la nôtre.
Confidence gives more to conversation than intelligence.
La confiance fournit plus à la conversation que l'esprit.
It is a way for us to somehow add to beautiful actions, to praise them with a sincere heart.
C'est en quelque sorte se donner part aux belles actions, que de les louer de bon coeur.
One mustn't judge a man by his great qualities, but by the use that he makes of them.
On ne doit pas juger du mérite d'un homme par ses grandes qualités, mais par l'usage qu'il en sait faire.
A person never ardently hopes for something that he hopes for only because his reason advises him to.
On ne souhaite jamais ardemment ce qu'on ne souhaite que par raison.
On Conversation
What makes so few people agreeable in conversation is that each person thinks more about what he wants to say than about what others are saying. A person must listen to those who are speaking, if he wants to be listened to; he must let them make themselves understood, and even say things that are useless. Instead of contradicting or interrupting them, as one often does, a person must, on the contrary, enter into their spirit and taste, show that he understands them, talk to them about what touches them, praise what they say as much as it merits praise, and make them see that it's more by choice that he praises them than by courtesy. A person must avoid contesting indifferent things, rarely ask useless questions, never give the impression that he is claiming to be more in the right than others, and easily cede the advantage of deciding.
A person must say things that are natural, easy, and more or less serious, according to the humor or inclination of the people being spoken to; not press them to approve of what he is saying, nor even to respond to it. When he has satisfied these duties to politeness, he can say his feelings, without being biased or opinionated, while making it seem that he is supporting the opinions of those being spoken to.
A person must avoid speaking for a long time about himself, and giving himself as an example. A person cannot apply himself too much to knowing the inclination and meaning of those being spoken to, in order to join himself to their greatest intelligence, and add it's thoughts to his own, while given the impression as much as possible that it's from them that he is taking them. There is cleverness in not exhausting the subjects one speaks of, and to always leave something to others to think and say.
A person must never speak with airs of authority, nor use words and terms greater than the things being spoken about. He can conserve his opinions if they are reasonable; but in conserving them, he must never hurt the feelings of others, nor seem shocked by what they say. It is dangerous to always want to be the leader of the conversation, and to speak too often about the same thing; he must enter indifferently into any agreeable subject that presents itself, and never give the impression that he is trying to lead the conversation to what he wants to say.
It's necessary to observe that every sort of conversation, however honest or spiritual it might be, is not equally appropriate to every sort of honest person: one must choose what fits each person, and even choose the right time for saying it; but if there is very much art in speaking, there is not less in being silent. There is an eloquent silence: it sometimes serves to approve and to condemn; there is a mocking silence; there is a respectful silence; there are airs, movements, and mannerisms that often make what a person says in a conversation agreeable or disagreeable, delicate or shocking. The secret of using them well is given to few people; even those who decide the rules are mistaken about them sometimes; the surest thing, in my opinion, is never to be obstinate, sooner to seem negligent in what one says than affected, to listen, to hardly speak, and never to force oneself to speak.
On Taste
There are people who have more intelligence than taste, and others who have more taste than intelligence; there is more variety and capriciousness in taste than in intelligence.
The word taste has various meanings, and it is easy to misunderstand what a person is trying to say. There is a difference between the taste that attracts us to things, and the taste that allows us to know and discern something's quality by considering what is necessary; a person can love comedy without having a subtle or delicate enough taste to judge it well, and a person can also have good enough taste to judge it well without liking it. There are tastes that we acquire imperceptibly through what we are exposed to; with others we get carried away because of their strength or because of how long we have had them.
There are people who have bad taste in everything; others only have bad taste in certain things, and have a discerning and just taste in a field that belongs to them. Still others have strange tastes that they know are bad, and which they try to ignore. There are some people who aren't sure about their tastes; chance decides what they are; they change them out of light-mindedness, and find that something is pleasant or bothersome according to what their friends have said. Others are always biased; they are slaves to their tastes and conserve them all of the time. There are people who are sensitive to what is good, and are shocked by what isn't; their views are clear and just, and they find the reasons for their taste with their intelligence and discernment.
There are some people who, out of a sort of instinct whose cause they don't know, are decisive about what they are presented with and always choose what is best. These people seem to have more taste than intelligence, because their vanity and their moods never overcome their natural insight; everything is in concert inside of them, everything takes the same tone. This harmony makes them judge things sanely, and allows them to see how things are; but, to make a generalization, there are few people whose taste is certain and independent of others; they follow custom and others' example, and nearly every taste that they have comes from outside of them.
Among all of the different tastes that one finds, it is very rare, and nearly impossible, to encounter the type of good taste which knows the worth of each thing, recognizes all of the ways it could be valuable, and takes delight in it: our knowledge is too limited, and the harmonious disposition of a person's qualities which allows him to judge well usually only lasts for any length of time when he considers things that don't concern him directly. When it is a question of ourselves, our taste does not have this justice, which is so necessary; our preoccupations disturb it, everything that is of concern to us appears with a different air. No one sees the things that touch them and the things that don't with the same eyes; then our taste is often driven by our vanity and our mood, which make us see things differently and subject us to an infinite number of regrets and uncertainties; our taste is no longer our own, we no longer dispose of it as we see fit, it changes without our consent, and the same objects appear to us with so many different aspects that we finally don't know our own views and our own feelings.
On Society
I don't intend to speak about friendship when speaking about society; although they have some similarities, they are nevertheless very different: the first has more elevation and dignity, and the greatest merit of the second is to resemble it. From here on I will only speak about that particular interaction which civilized men have with each other.
It would be useless to say how necessary society is for men: they all desire it and seek it out, but few make use of the means for rendering it pleasant and making it last. Each person wants to find his pleasure and advantages at the expense of others; one always prefers oneself to the people one is living with, and nearly always makes this preference felt; that is what troubles and destroys society. It is necessary to at least know how to hide this preference, since it is too natural in us to be able to destroy it; it's necessary to give pleasure to ourselves and others, and to manage and never offend their vanity.
Esprit does a good deal in such a great undertaking, but by itself it isn't enough to lead us along the various paths that we must take. The similarity that can be found between peoples esprit would not sustain society for very long if it were not ruled and supported by good sense, by the peoples humors, and by the displays of respect that they show each other. If it sometimes happens that people of opposed humor and esprit seem to come together, they are doubtlessly tied by some foreign interests, which do not last long. One can also keep company with others over whom we have superiority of birth or of personal qualities; but people who have this advantage must not abuse it; they must rarely make it felt, and only use it to instruct others; a person must lead them to the perception that they need to be guided, and then lead them with reason, while accomodating himself to their feelings and interests as much as possible.
For society to agree with people, each person must conserve his liberty: it's necessary for people to see each other or not see each other at all, to divert each other, or even to bore each other, without being forced; people must be able to separate, without this separation signifiying any great change; a person must be able to do without others if he doesn't want to bother them, and he must remember that a person inconveniences other most often when he doesn't think he could be doing so. He must contribute as much as possible to the diversion of the people he is living with; but he must not always be loaded with a concern for doing so. Indulgence is necessary in society, but it must have limits: it becomes servility when it is excessive; it must at least appear to be done freely, and when we adjust to our friend's feelings, they must be persuaded that we are also following our own.
We must easily excuse our friends for the faults that they were born with, especially when they are smaller than their good qualities; we must often avoid letting them see that we have noticed them and been shocked, and we must try as much as we can to leave them to perceive their faults themselves, and leave them the merit of correcting them.
There is a certain type of politeness that is necessary when civilized people interact; it allows them to listen to jokes about themselves, and prevents them from being shocked or from shocking others by certain ways of speaking that are too dry and hard, which often escape without a person thinking when he heatedly maintains his opinion.
Commerce between civilized people cannot subsist for very long without a certain confidence in each other; it must be common among them; each person must have an air of sureness and discretion which never lets people fear that he will speak imprudently.
A persons spirit must have variety: people who only have one type of esprit cannot please others for a long time. A person can take different paths and have neither the same views nor the same talents, provided that it pleases the company he is in, and provided that in doing so he observes the same justice that the different voices and instruments observe in music.
Since it is difficult for the self-interests of many people to agree on the same thing, it is at least necessary, for the peacefulness of society, that they are not contrary to each other. We must foresee what will please our friends, look for ways to be useful to them, spare them distress, have them see that we share it when we cannot take it away, subtely and slowly efface it without trying to do away with it all at once, and put pleasant objects in the place of it, or at least ones that occupy them. We can speak about things that concern them, but only for so far as they permit it, and we must be very careful to limit ourselves in doing so; there is politeness and sometimes even humanity, in not going too deeply into the recesses of their heart; it is often painful for people to let others see everything they recognize in their heart, and still more everything they don't recognize. Although the commerce among civilized people lends them some familiarity and furnishes them with an infinite number of subjects in which they may speak sincerely about themselves, nearly no one has sufficient docility and good sense to take to heart many warnings that are necessary to maintain society: a person wants to be informed to a certain point, but not in everything, and one is afraid to know every sort of truth.
Just as we must keep our distance to see objects, we must also do so in society: each person has a certain point of view from which he wants to be regarded; one is most often right not to want to be seen from too close, and there is nearly no man who wants, in all things, to allow himself to be seen as he is.
[Note: the context probably clarified the ambiguity of the translation, but 'society' is meant only in the social sense. Also, 'civilized people' is 'honnêtes gens' in the original, which is literally 'honest people', but often referred to people with manners, of good breeding, especially the nobility.]
De la Société
Mon dessein n'est pas de parler de l'amitié en parlant de la société; bien qu'elles aient quelque rapport, elles sont néanmoins très différentes: la première a plus d'élévation et de dignité, et le plus grand mérite de l'autre, c'est de lui ressembler. Je ne parlerai donc présentement que du commerce particulier que les honnêtes gens doivent avoir ensemble.
Il serait inutile de dire combien la société est nécessaire aux hommes: tous la désirent et tous la cherchent, mais peu se servent des moyens de la rendre agréable et de la faire durer. Chacun veut trouver son plaisir et ses avantages aux dépens des autres; on se préfère toujours à ceux avec qui on se propose de vivre, et on leur fait presque toujours sentir cette préférence; c'est ce qui trouble et qui détruit la société. Il faudrait du moins savoir cacher ce désir de préférence, puisqu'il est trop naturel en nous pour nous en pouvoir défaire; il faudrait faire son plaisir et celui des autres, ménager leur amour-propre, et ne le blesser jamais.
L'esprit a beaucoup de part à un si grand ouvrage, mais il ne suffit pas seul pour nous conduire dans les divers chemins qu'il faut tenir. Le rapport qui se rencontre entre les esprits ne maintiendrait pas longtemps la société, si elle n'était réglée et soutenue par le bon sens, par l'humeur, et par des égards qui doivent être entre les personnes qui veulent vivre ensemble. S'il arrive quelquefois que des gens opposés d'humeur et d'esprit paraissent unis, ils tiennent sans doute par des liaisons étrangères, qui ne dure pas longtemps. On peut être aussi en société avec des personnes sur qui nous avons de la supériorité par la naissance ou par des qualités personnelles; mais ceux qui ont cet avantage n'en doivent pas abuser; ils doivent rarement le faire sentir, et ne s'en servir que pour instruire les autres; ils doivent les faire apercevoir qu'ils ont besoin d'être conduits, et les mener par raison, en s'accommodant autant qu'il est possible à leur sentiments et à leurs intérêts.
Pour rendre la société commode, il faut que chacun conserve sa liberté: il faut se voir, ou ne se voir point, sans sujétion, se divertir ensemble, et même s'ennuyer ensemble; il faut se pouvoir séparer, sans que cette séparation apporte de changement; il faut se pouvoir passer les uns des autres, si on ne veut pas s'exposer à embarrasser quelquefois, et on doit se souvenir qu'on incommode souvent, quand on croit ne pouvoir jamais incommoder. Il faut contribuer, autant qu'on le peut, au divertissement des personnes avec qui on veut vivre; mais il ne faut pas être toujours chargé du soin d'y contribuer. La complaisance est nécessaire danas la société, mais elle doit avoir des bornes: elle devient une servitude quand elle est excessive; il faut du moins qu'elle paraisse libre, et qu'en suivant le sentiment de nos amis, ils soient persuadés que c'est le nôtre aussi que nous suivons.
Il faut être facile à excuser nos amis, quand leurs défauts sont nés avec eux, et qu'ils sont moindres que leurs bonnes qualités; il faut souvent éviter de leur faire valoir qu'on les ait remarqués et qu'on en soit choqué, et on doit essayer de faire en sorte qu'ils puissent s'en apercevoir eux-mêmes, pour leur laisser le mérite de s'en corriger.
Il y a une sorte de politesse qui est nécessaire dans le commerce des honnêtes gens; elle leur fait entendre raillerie, et elle les empêche d'être choqués et de choquer les autres par de certaines façons de parler trop sèches et trop dures, qui échappent souvent sans y penser, quand on soutient son opinion avec chaleur.
Le commerce des honnêtes gens ne peut subsister sans une certaine sorte de confiance; elle doit être commune entre eux; il faut que chacun ait un air de sûreté et de discrétion qui ne donne jamais lieu de craindre qu'on puisse rien dire par imprudence.
Il faut de la variété dans l'esprit: ceux qui n'ont que d'une sorte d'esprit ne peuvent plaire longtemps. On peut prendre des routes diverses, n'avoir pas les mêmes vues ni les mêmes talents, pourvu qu'on aide au plaisir de la société, et qu'on y observe la même justesse que les différentes voix et les divers instruments doivent observer dans la musique.
Comme il est malaisé que plusieurs personnes puissent avoir les mêmes intérêts, il est nécessaire au moins, pour la douceur de la société, qu'ils n'en aient pas de contraires. On doit aller au-devant de ce qui peut plaire à ses amis, chercher les moyens de leur être utile, leur épargner des chagrins, leur faire voir qu'on les partage avec eux quand on ne peut les détourner, les effacer insensiblement sans prétendre de les arracher tout d'un coup, et mettre en la place des objets agréables, ou du moins qui les occupent. On peut leur parler des choses qui les regardent, mais ce n'est qu'autant qu'ils le permettent, et on y doit garder beaucoup de mesure; il y a de la politesse, et quelquefois même de l'humanité, à ne pas entrer trop avant dans les replis de leur coeur; ils ont souvent de la peine à laisser voir tout ce qu'ils en connaissent, et ils en ont encore davantage quand on pénètre ce qu'ils ne connaissent pas. Bien que le commerce que les honnêtes gens ont ensemble leur donne de la familiarité, et leur fournisse un nombre infini de sujet de se parler sincèremetn, personne presque n'a assez de docilité et de bon sens pour bien recevoir plusieurs avis qui sont nécessaires pour maintenir la société: on veut être averti jusqu'à un certain point, mais on ne veut pas l'être en toutes choses, et on craint de savoir toutes sortes de vérités.
Comme on doit garder des distances pour voir les objets, il en faut garder aussi pour la société: chacun a son point de vue, d'où il veut être regardé; on a raison, le plus souvent, de ne vouloir pas être éclairé de trop près, et il n'y a presque point d'homme qui veuille, en toutes choses, se laisser voir tel qu'il est.
Moral Reflections
Réflexions Morales
Our virtues are, most often, only vices in disguise.
Nos vertus ne sont, le plus souvent, que des vices déguisés.
1
What we take for virtues are often only assemblies of diverse actions and diverse interests, which fortune or our industry arrange; and it is not always because of valor and chastity that men are valiant and that women are chaste.
Ce que nous prenons pour des vertus n'est souvent qu'un assemblage de diverses actions et de divers intérêts, que la fortune ou notre industrie savent arranger; et ce n'est pas toujours par valeur et par chasteté que les hommes sont vaillants, et que les femmes sont chastes.
2
Self-love is the greatest of all flatterers.
L'amour-propre est le plus grand de tous les flatteurs.
3
Whatever discovery one has made in the country of self-love, there still remains many lands that are unknown.
Quelque découverte que l'on ait faire dans le pays de l'amour-propre, il y reste encore bien des terres inconnues.
4
Self-love is cleverer than the cleverest man in the world.
L'amour-propre est plus habile que le plus habile homme du monde.
5
The duration of our passions depends no more on us than the duration of our life.
La durée de nos passions ne dépend pas plus de nous que la durée de notre vie.
6
Passion often makes the cleverest man mad, and often renders the most foolish men clever.
La passion fait souvent un fou du plus habile homme, et rend souvent les plus sots habiles.
7
The great and brilliant actions that dazzle our eyes are represented by politicians as the result of great designs, whereas they are usually the result of moods and passions. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, which people attribute to their ambition to become master of the world, perhaps only resulted from jealousy.
Ces grandes et éclatantes actions qui éblouissent les yeux sont représentées par les politiques comme les effets des grands desseins, au lieu que ce sont d'ordinaire les effets de l'humeur et des passions. Ainsi la guerre d'Auguste et d'Antoine, qu'on rapporte à l'ambition qu'ils avaient de se rendre maîtres du monde, n'était peut-être qu'un effet de jalousie.
8
The passions are the only orators who always persuade. They are like the wiles of nature whose rules are infallible; and the simplest man who is passionate is more persuasive than the most eloquent man who is not at all.
Les passions sont les seuls orateurs qui persuadent toujours. Elles sont comme un art de la nature dont les règles sont infaillibles; et l'homme le plus simple qui a de la passion persuade mieux que le plus éloquent qui n'en a point.
9
The passions have an injustice and a self-interest that makes it dangerous to follow them, and makes it necessary to distrust them even when they seem most reasonable.
Les passions ont une injustice et un propre intérêt qui fait qu'il est dangereux de les suivre, et qu'on s'en doit défier lors même qu'elles paraissent les plus raisonnables.
[It is perhaps interesting to compare the revisions La Rochefoucauld made to some of these maxims, and it may give some insight into how he came up with them. For Maxim 9:
Originally:
The passions have an injustice and a self-interest that makes them always give affront and do harm, even when they speak reasonably and equitably; affection/love alone has the privilege of saying whatever it likes without ever hurting anyone.
Les passions ont une injustice et un propre intérêt qui fait qu'elles offensent et blessent toujours, même lorsqu'elles parlent raisonnablement et équitablement; la charité a seule le privilège de dire quasi tout ce qui lui plaît et de ne blesser jamais personne.
Then:
The passions have an injustice and a self-interest that makes it dangerous to follow them, even when they seem most reasonable.
Les passions ont une injustice et un propre intérêt qui fait qu'il est dangereux de les suivre, lors même qu'elles paraissent les plus raisonnables.
Then the final version out of brackets above.
The book has a note for this maxim:
"This maxim was initially a maxim by Jacques Esprit, as a letter from Mme de Maure to Mme de Sablé proves. In its original form (see variants), it represents a narrow enough application of Saint Augustine's caritas sola non peccat (only affection/love doesn't sin)." ]
10
There is a perpetual generation of passions in the human heart, in such a way that the ruin of one is nearly always the establishment of another.
Il y a dans le coeur humain une génération perpétuelle de passions, en sorte que la ruine de l'une est presque toujours l'établissement d'une autre.
11
Passions often generate others that are contrary to them. Avarice sometimes produces prodigality, and prodigality avarice; one is often steadfast due to weakness, and audacious because of timidity.
Les passions en engendrent souvent qui leur sont contraires. L'avarice produit quelquefois la prodigalité, et la prodigalité l'avarice; on est souvent ferme par faiblesse, et audacieux par timidité.
12
Whatever care a person takes to cover his passions with appearances of piety and honor, they always appear from behind these veils.
Quelque soin que l'on prenne de couvrir ses passions par des apparences de piété et d'honneur, elles paraissent toujours au travers de ces voiles.
13
Our self-love suffers the condamnation of our tastes more impatiently than of our opinions.
Notre amour-propre souffre plus impatiemment la condamnation de nos goûts que de nos opinions.
14
Men are not only subject to forget favors and injuries; they even hate people who have obliged them, and cease to hate others who have done them outrages. The application it takes to recompense good, and to avenge onself for bad, seems to them like a servitude difficult to submit to.
Les hommes ne sont pas seulement sujets à perdre le souvenir des bienfaits et des injures; ils haïssent même ceux qui les ont obligé, et cessent de haïr ceux qui leur ont fait des outrages. L'application à récompenser le bien, et à se venger du mal, leur paraît une servitude à laquelle ils ont peine de se soumettre.
15
The mercy of princes is often only a politic for winning the affection of the people.
La clémence des princes n'est souvent qu'une politique pour gagner l'affection des peuples.
16
This mercy which one makes into a virtue is shown sometimes due to vanity, occasionally due to laziness, often due to fear, and nearly always due to all three together.
Cette clémence dont on fait une vertu se pratique tantôt par vanité, quelquefois par paresse, souvent par crainte, et presque toujours par tous les trois ensemble.
[Note in book: "Maxim 16 completes or corrects maxim 15, of more neatly Machiavellian inspiration. One cannot help but think here of the motivations of Augustus in Cinna.
Variants:
Mercy is a mixture of glory, laziness and fear which we make into a virtue.
La clémence c'est une mélange de gloire, de paresse et de crainte dont nous faisons une vertu.
Mercy, which we make into a virtue, is done sometimes for the sake of glory, occasionally due to laziness, often due to fear, and nearly always due to all three together.
La clémence, dont nous faisons une vertu, se pratique tantôt pour la gloire, quelquefois par paresse, souvent par crainte, et presque toujours par tous les trois ensemble.]
17
The moderation of happy people comes from the calm that a good fortune gives to their humor.
La modération des personnes heureuses vient du calme que la bonne fortune donne à leur humeur.
18
Moderation is a fear of falling into the envy and scorn that those people merit who are intoxicated by their good luck; it is a vain display of the force of our spirit; and finally the moderation of men at their highest elevation is a desire to seem greater than their fortune.
La modération est une crainte de tomber dans l'envie et dans le mépris que méritent ceux qui s'enivrent de leur bonheur; c'est une vaine ostentation de la force de notre esprit; et enfin la modération des hommes dans leur plus haute élévation est un désir de paraître plus grands que leur fortune.
19
We all have enough strength to bear the misfortunes of others.
Nous avons tous assez de force pour supporter les maux d'autrui.
20
The constancy of sages is only the art of confining their agitation in their hearts.
La constance des sages n'est que l'art de renfermer leur agitation dans le coeur.
21
People who are condemned to torture sometimes affect a constancy and a scorn for death which is in fact only a fear of seeing it clearly. In this case a person could say that this constancy and this scorn are to their spirit what a blindfold is to their eyes.
Ceux qu'on condamne au supplice affectent quelquefois une constance et un mépris de la mort qui n'est en effect que la crainte de l'envisager. De sorte qu'on peut dire que cette constance et ce mépris sont à leur esprit ce que le bandeau est à leurs yeux.
22
Philosophy easily triumphs over past and future evils, but present evils triumph over it.
[There are some variants for this, the most significant difference being that 'triumph' {triomphe} was originally 'works wonders' {faire des merveilles}.]
La philosophie triomphe aisément des maux passés et des maux à venir. Mais les maux présents triomphent d'elle.
23
Few people know death. One usually does not endure it through resolution, but through stupidity and custom; and most men die because they cannot help it.
Peu de gens connaissent la mort. On ne la souffre pas ordinairement par résolution, mais par stupidité et par coutume; et la plupart des hommes meurent parce qu'on ne peut s'empêcher de mourir.
24
When great men allow themselves to be brought down by the length of their misfortunes, they show that they only bore them because of the strength of their ambition, and not because of the strength of their soul, and that except for great vanity, heroes are made in the same way as other men.
Lorsque les grands hommes se laissent abattre par la longueur de leurs infortunes, ils font voir qu'ils ne les soutenaient que par la force de leur ambition, et non par celle de leur âme, et qu'à une grande vanité près les héros sont faits comme les autres hommes.
25
A person needs greater virtues to endure good fortune than bad.
Il faut de plus grandes vertus pour soutenir la bonne fortune que la mauvaise.
26
Neither the sun nor death can be looked at fixedly.
Le soleil ni la mort ne se peuvent regarder fixement.
27
One often founds ones vanity on having even the most criminal passions; but envy is a timid and shamefaced passion that never dares admit itself.
On fait souvent vanité des passions même les plus criminelles; mais l'envie est une passion timide et honteuse que l'on n'ose jamais avouer.
28
Jealousy is in a certain way just and reasonable, since it only tries to conserve a good which belongs to us, or which we think belongs to us; whereas envy is a fury that cannot bear the good things of others.
La jalousie est en quelque manière juste et raisonnable, puisqu'elle ne tend qu'à conserver un bien qui nous appartient, ou que nous croyons nous appartenir; au lieu que l'envie est une fureur qui ne peut souffrir le bien des autres.
29
The bad that we do does not attract as much persecution and hatred as our good qualities.
Le mal que nous faisons ne nous attire pas tant de persécution et de haine que nos bonnes qualités.
30
We have more strength than will; and it is often to excuse us to ourselves that we imagine that things are impossible.
Nous avons plus de force que de volonté; et c'est souvent pour nous excuser à nous-mêmes que nous imaginons que les choses sont impossibles.
31
If we did not have any faults, we would not take as much pleasure in noticing those of others.
Si nous n'avions point de défauts, nous ne prendrions pas tant de plaisir à en remarquer dans les autres.
32
Jealousy feeds itself on doubts, and it either turns into a fury or it ends as soon as a person passes from doubt to certainty.
La jalousie se nourrit dans les doutes, et elle devient fureur, ou elle finit, sitôt qu'on passe du doute à la certitude.
33
Pride always recovers itself and loses nothing even when it renounces vanity.
L'orgueil se dédommage toujours et ne perd rien lors même qu'il renonce à la vanité.
34
If we did not have any pride, we would not complain about the pride of others.
Si nous n'avions point d'orgueil, nous ne nous plaindrions pas de celui des autres.
35
Pride is equally present in all men, and the only difference is in the way and manner of showing it.
L'orgueil est égal dans tous les hommes, et il n'y a de différence qu'aux moyens et à la manière de le mettre au jour.
36
It seems that nature, which has so wisely arranged the organs of our body in order to make us happy, has also given us pride in order to spare us the sadness of knowing our imperfections.
[Note in book: 'The irony of this maxim comes from it seeming to justify pride, though it is inseperable from self-love/vanity {'amour-propre'}. The theme of the paradoxical utility of bad things is already found, with respect to presumption, in the Essays of Montaigne.']
Il semble que la nature, qui a si sagement disposé les organes de notre corps pour nous rendre heureux, nous ait aussi donné l'orgueil pour nous épargner la douleur de connaître nos imperfections.
37
Pride plays a greater part than kindness in the remonstrances that we make to those who display certain faults; and we do not reproach them so much to correct them as to persuade them that we are free from their mistakes.
L'orgueil a plus de part que la bonté aux remontrances que nous faisons à ceux qui commettent des fautes; et nous ne les reprenons pas tant pour les en corriger que pour leur persuader que nous en sommes exempts.
38
We promise according to our hopes, and we follow through according to our fears.
Nous promettons selon nos espérances, et nous tenons selon nos craintes.
39
Self-interest speaks all sorts of languages, and plays all sorts of roles, even that of disinterestedness.
L'intérêt parle toutes sortes de langues, et joue toutes sortes de personnages, même celui de désintéressé.
40
Self-interest, which blinds some people, enlightens others.
L'intérêt, qui aveugle les uns, fait la lumière des autres.
41
People who apply themselves too much to little things usually become incapable of great ones.
Ceux qui s'appliquent trop aux petites choses deviennent ordinairement incapables des grandes.
42
We do not have enough strength to follow all of our reason.
[Note in book: Mme de Sévigné wrote to her daughter, the Cartesienne Mme de Grignan (14 July 1680): "You spoke a thousand times better than M. de La Rochefoucauld [...] We do not have enough reason to make use of all of our strength." ]
Nous n'avons pas assez de force pour suivre toute notre raison.
43
A man often thinks he conducts himself when he is being conducted; and while his intelligence intends one goal, his heart insensibly carries him toward another.
L'homme croit souvent se conduire lorsqu'il est conduit; et pendant que par son esprit il tend à un but, son coeur l'entraîne insensiblement à un autre.
44
Strength or weakness of soul are badly named; they are in fact only the good or bad disposition of the organs of our body.
La force et la faiblesse de l'esprit sont mal nommées; elles ne sont en effet que la bonne ou la mauvaise disposition des organes du corps.
45
The caprice of our humor is even more bizarre than that of fortune.
Le caprice de notre humeur est encore plus bizarre que celui de la fortune.
46
The attachment or indifference that philosophers have felt toward life was only a taste of their vanity, which can be disputed no more than a person's taste in language or in choice of colors.
L'attachement ou l'indifférence que les philosophes avaient pour la vie n'était qu'un goût de leur amour-propre, dont on ne doit non plus disputer que du goût de la langue ou du choix des couleurs.
47
Our humor decides the value of all that comes to us through fortune.
Notre humeur met le prix à tout ce qui nous vient de la fortune.
48
Happiness comes from our taste and not from things; and it is by having what one likes that a person is happy, and not by having what pleases other people.
La félicité est dans le goût et non pas dans les choses; et c'est par avoir ce qu'on aime qu'on est heureux, et non par avoir ce que les autres trouvent aimable.
49
A person is never as happy or as unhappy as he imagines.
On n'est jamais si heureux ni si malheureux qu'on s'imagine.
50
People who think they have merit consider it an honor to be unfortunate, in order to persuade other people and themselves that they are worthy adversaries of fortune.
Ceux qui croient avoir du mérite se font un honneur d'être malheureux, pour persuader aux autres et à eux-mêmes qu'ils sont dignes d'être en butte à la fortune.
51
Nothing must make us less satisfied with ourselves than to see that we disapprove of something at one time that we approved of at another.
Rien ne doit tant diminuer la satisfaction que nous avons de nous-mêmes, que de voir que nous désapprouvons dans un temps ce que nous approuvions dans un autre.
52
Whatever difference there seems to be between men's fortunes, there is nonetheless a certain balance of good and bad things which makes them equal.
Quelque différence qui paroisse entre les fortunes, il y a néanmoins une certaine compensation de biens et de maux, qui les rend égales.
53
Whatever great advantages nature gives us, it is not nature alone, but chance added to nature that creates heros.
Quelques grands avantages que la nature donne, ce n'est pas elle seule, mais la fortune avec elle qui fait les héros.
54
Scorn for wealth in philosophers was a hidden desire to avenge their merit for the injustice of chance by scorning the same good things which they were deprived of; it was a secret way to save themselves from seeming base because of being poor; it was a detour to the consideration that they didn't have through wealth.
Le mépris des richesses étoit, dans les philosophes, un desir caché de venger leur mérite de l'injustice de la fortune, par le mépris des mêmes biens dont elle les privoit; c'étoit un secret pour se garantir de l'avilissement de la pauvreté; c'étoit un chemin détourné pour aller à la considération qu'ils ne pouvoient avoir par les richesses.
55
Hatred for people's favorites is only love of people's favor. Spite for not being a person's favorite oneself is consoled and softened by the scorn that a person shows to the person who is the favorite; and we refuse to think well of that person because we can't take away from him the qualities that make everyone else do so.
La haine pour les favoris n'est autre chose que l'amour de la faveur. Le dépit de ne la pas posséder se console et s'adoucit par le mépris que l'on témoigne de ceux qui la possèdent; et nous leur refusons nos hommages, ne pouvant pas leur ôter ce qui leur attire ceux de tout le monde.
56
In order to become established in the world, a person does everything he can to make it seem like he already is established.
Pour s'établir dans le monde, on fait tout ce que l'on peut pour y paroître établi.
57
Although men flatter themselves for their great actions, they are often not the result of a grand design but of chance.
Quoique les hommes se flattent de leurs grandes actions, elles ne sont pas souvent les effets d'un grand dessein, mais des effets du hasard.
58
It seems that our actions have fortunate or unfortunate stars, to which they owe a great part of the praise or blame people give them.
Il semble que nos actions aient des étoiles heureuses ou malheureuses, à qui elles doivent une grande partie de la louange et du blâme qu'on leur donne.
59
There is no accident so unfortunate that clever people don't turn it to some advantage, nor any accident so fortunate that imprudent people can't turn it against them.
Il n'y a point d'accidents si malheureux dont les habiles gens ne tirent quelque avantage, ni de si heureux que les imprudents ne puissent tourner à leur préjudice.
60
Chance turns everything to the advantage of a person it favors.
La fortune tourne tout à l'avantage de ceux qu'elle favorise.
61
The happiness and unhappiness of men depends as much on their mood as on their fortune.
Le bonheur et le malheur des hommes ne dépend pas moins de leur humeur que de la fortune.
62
Sincerity is an openness of heart. One finds it in very few people; and one usually only sees a subtle dissimulation done for the purpose of acquiring other's trust.
La sincérité est une ouverture de cœur. On la trouve en fort peu de gens;et celle que l'on voit d'ordinaire n'est qu'une fine dissimulation pour attirer la confiance des autres.
63
Hatred of lying is often an imperceptible ambition to make our testimony carry weight, and to make people regard our words as sacred.
L'aversion du mensonge est souvent une imperceptible ambition de rendre nos témoignages considérables, et d'attirer à nos paroles un respect de religion.
64
The truth doesn't do as many good things in the world as the false appearance of it does harm.
La vérité ne fait pas tant de bien dans le monde, que ses apparences y font de mal.
65
Every praise is given to prudence; meanwhile, it isn't able to assure us of the smallest outcome.
Il n'y a point d'éloges qu'on ne donne à la prudence; cependant elle ne sauroit nous assurer du moindre évènement.
66
A clever man must determine the priority of his interests and carry out each accordingly. Our voracity often prevents their success by making us chase after many things at the same time, and while we want what is less important overmuch, we fail in what is most consequential.
Un habile homme doit régler le rang de ses intérêts, et les conduire chacun dans son ordre. Notre avidité le trouble souvent, en nous faisant courir à tant de choses à la fois, que pour desirer trop les moins importantes, on manque les plus considérables.
67
Grace is to the body what good sense is to the mind.
La bonne grace est au corps ce que le bon sens est à l'esprit.
68
Il est difficile de définir l'amour; ce qu'on en peut dire est que, dans l ame, c'est une passion de régner; dans les esprits, c'est une sympathie; et dans le corps, ce n'est qu'une envie cachée et délicate de posséder ce que l'on aime, après beaucoup de mystères.
69
S'il y a un amour pur et exempt du mélange de nos autres passions, c'est celui qui est caché au fond du cœur, et que nous ignorons nous-mêmes1.
70
Il n'y a point de déguisement qui puisse longtemps cacher l'amour où il est, ni le feindre où il n'est pas.
71
Il n'y a guère de gens qui ne soient honteux de s'être aimés, quand ils ne s'aiment plus.
